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456 JOHNSON V. MORRILL [20 C. (2d) 
tinguished from the present proceeding, the property was 
acquired for use by the United States Government in the 
performance of a governmental function, and exclusive juris-
diction was consented to or ceded ;by the state and was exer-
cised by the United States. [5] Land acquired by the United 
States which is not subject to the exclusive legislative author-
ity vested by the Constitution, remains subject to the juris-
diction of the state in matters not inconsistent with the free 
and effective use of the land for the purpose for which it was 
acquired. Further or exclusive authority may be ceded by 
the state on any terms acceptable to the United States. (Fort 
Leavenworth R. 00. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525 [5 S. Ct. 995, 29 L. 
Ed. 264] ; Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U. S. 399 [16 S. Ct. 837, 
40 L. Ed. 1015]; United States v. UnzelUta, supraj Surplus 
Trading 00. v. Oook, supra; Oollins v. Yosemite 00., supra.) 
[4b] There is no showing in the present proceedings that grants 
of authority have been expressly conferred by cession or agree-
ment. The United States cannot be compelled to accept the 
burdens of exclusive jurisdiction along with the title to land 
acquired for purposes not strictly within the classes designated 
in the Constitution. (Silas Mason 00. v.Tax Oommission, 
302 U. S. 186 [58 S. Ct. 233, 82 L. Ed. 187] ; Atkinson v. 
State Tax Commission, 303 U. S. 20 [58 S. Ct. 419, 82 L. Ed. 
621] .) By the Lanham Act the Pederal Government expressly 
declined exclusive jurisdiction; and as to the project known 
as "Navy 2" acquired under the earlier act, it does not appear 
to have desired or to have exercised such exclusive jurisdiction. 
There is therefore no sound basis upon which we may an-
nounce the conclusion that the United States has undertaken 
such jurisdiction of the defense housing project known as 
"Navy 2" as would deprive citizens residing thereon of the 
elective franchise, as distinguished fro~ citizens residing 
on .other projects who were expressly declared not to be 
deemed deprived of their civil or political rights. Accordingly 
we have concluded that the petitioner, Dorothy Johnson, is 
also entitled to have her affidavit of registration accepted by 
the respondent. 
Let the peremptory writ issue as prayed in each of said 
proceedings. 
Gibson, C .• J., Curti!': . .T .. F,dmonds. J., Carter, J., Traynor, 
J., and Ward, J. pro tern., concurred. 
t 
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CAROL BLANK, Appellant, v. IAN COFFIN et aI., Defen-
dants; MERCANTILE ACCEPTANCE CORPORA-






Automobiles-Persons Liable-Lender-Possession by Em-
ployee-Permission.-If the evidence shows that an automo-
bile was being driven by an employee of the owner at the time 
of an accident, the jury may infer that the employee. was op-
erating the automobile with the permission of the owner. 
Evidence-Inferences-Question of Fact.-If a jury can. rea-
sonably infer from primary facts that the material fact e.:<rists, 
the party has introduced sufficient evidence to entitle him to 
have the jury decide the issue. As to whether a particular in-
ference can be drawn from certain evidence is a question of 
law, but as to whether the inference shall be drawn in a given 
case is a question of fact. 
Trial-"-Questions for Court and Jury-Instruction.-If evi-
dence contrary to the existence of the fact. in issue 'is clear, 
positive, uncontradicted, and of such a nature that it cannot 
rationally be disbelieved, the court must instruct the jury that 
the nonexistence of the fact has been established as a matter 
of law. 
Witnesses-Determination of Credibility-Uncontradicted Tes-. 
timony.-The jury is free to disbelieve witnesses even though 
they are uncontradicted, if there is any rational ground for do-' 
ing so. And in most cases they may disbelieve the evidence as 
to the nonexistence of a primary fact and find that it does 
exist as a basis of an inference of the fact in issue .. 
Automobiles-Actions.....:..Directed Verdict-For Owner.-In· an 
action against the employee-operator and the owner of an 
automobile arising out of a collision at a time when the em-
.ployee-operator was not acting within the scope of his employ-
ment, it was error to direct a verdict for the owner where 
[1] See 2 Cal. Jur. Ten-year Supp. 508. 
,[2] See 10 Cal. Jur. 738; 29 Am. Jur. 165. 
[3] Disregarding uncontradicted testimony, note, 8 A. L. R. 796. 
See, also, 27 Cal. Jur. 184; 28 R. C. L. 660. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 6] Automobiles, § 167(4); [2] Evi-
dence, § 140; [3] Trial, § 125; [4J Witnesses, § 297; [5] Automo-
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from the fact of ownership and operation by an employee the 
jury could infer that the car was being operated with the own-
er's permission, and where the. owner introduced evidence con-
trary to such inference but there were grounds on which such 
evidence could be disbelieved. 
Id.-Persons Liable-Lender-Possession by Employee-Per-
mission.-The fact that an employee was accompanied by a 
friend in violati!l1,l of his employer's rules governing use of 
company automobiles does not establish the want of permis-
sion to drive the car. That fact, while pertinent where the 
passenger is injured and has knowledge of the rule, has no rel-
evancy where a third person is injured. 
Evidence-Admissibility-Conditions At Other Times.--:-Evi-
dence of the existence of a particular condition, relationship, 
or status, including permisslOn to use an automobile, before 
and after an act in question is admissible to indicate the ex-
istence of the same status, condition or relationship at the 
time of the act. In an action involving the question of an em-
ployer's permission to an employee to operate a car for per-
sonal business, it is proper to show personal· use of the car 
after the accident in question, knowledge thereof by the em-
ployee's superior and the failure to protest. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of .A.la-
meda County. Leon E. Gray, JUdge. Reversed. 
Action against driver and owner of an automobile for dam-
ages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile collision. 
Judgment in favor. of the owner pursuant to a directed ver-
dict, reversed. 
James R. Agee for Appellant. 
Hagar, Crosby & Crosby and Carlyle C. Crosby for Respon-
dent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On June 11, 1939, at about 4 a. m. an auto-
mobile belonging to the Mercantile Acceptance Corporation of 
California, while being driven by Ian Coffin, one of its em-
ployees, collided with an automobile being driven by Lester F. 
Kain, in which Mrs. Carol Blank was riding as a guest. Mrs. 
Blank was injured and brought an action for damages against 
Coffin and the Mercantile Acceptance Corporation, alleging 
that Coffin was negligent and that he was driving the car with 
the permission of its owner, the Acceptance Corporation. The 
Mercantile Acceptance Corporation is engaged in the business 
June 1942]· BLANK v. COFFIN 
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6f financing automobile loans and maintains a branch office 
in Oakland in charge of G. N. Stuperich. About three months 
before the accident Coffin was hired as a field man .by Stuper-
ich. His duties consisted principally in the exanunation and 
repossession of automobiles, and his territory covered ,much 
of the San Francisco Bay area. He was given the exclusive 
use 6f a company car to facilitate his work. He kept the car 
in the garage at his home in Berkeley free of charge to the 
company; He had no fixed hours of employment and occasion-
ally worked in the evenings. When he was hired Coffin was 
furnished with a mimeographed manual of instructions pro-
viding :" Each field man 'or collector will be supplied with a 
company. owned car. The employee to whom the car is as-
signed must see that it is kept in excellent condition at. all 
times at a minimum expense. Please note· the following in-
structions: . . . The company does not allow employees operat-
ing company cars to pick up riders or carry passengers unless 
they are employed by the company ... Company owned cars 
must not be use4 by the employees· on their vacations." Cof-
fin testified that when he was hired Stuperich told him orally 
never to use the car for pleas1ll'e or person!t1 matters. He also 
testified that he used the car on Sundays for his own pleasure 
~ and made overnight trips in it from time to time for his own 
pleasure but that at the time of the accident he was not on a 
vacation. He stated that ~ach· week he reported the mileage 
covered, including that covered on his personal business, but 
his reports on gasoline consumed omitted gasoline purchased 
for his' personal trips. Stuperich testified that he instructed 
Coffin not to use the car for personal business and that before 
the accident he severely reprimanded Coffin for taking the car 
on a week-end pleasure trip and threatened to discharge him 
in the event of another infraction. After a week's lay-off Cof-
fin resumed work and possession of the car. 
On the night of the accident Coffin and a friend attended a 
social function in the company of two young women. They had 
taken the young women home and were 'returning to Berkeley 
when the accident occurred. Coffin was driving north on 
Webster Street in Alameda, and Kain was driving south. 
Coffin's car struck Kain's car on the right side between the 
hood and the door. Coffin testified that Kain's car swerved 
over the center line of the street into his path. Kain and other 
witnesses for the plaintIff testified th,at Coffin's car swerved 
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and then swung back toward the center, striking the Kain 
car. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the Mercan-
tile Acceptance Corporation, and ;the jury returned a verdict 
against Coffin for $7,500. Plaintiff has appealed from the 
judgment entered in favor of the Mercantile Acceptance Cor-
poration upon the directed verdict. 
- Section 402a of the Vehicle Code provides: "Every owner 
of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death of or 
injury to person or property resulting from negligence in 
the operation of such motor vehicle, in the business of such 
owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same 
with the permission, express or implied,of such owner, and 
the negligence of such person shall be imputed to the owner 
for all purposes of civil damages." Section 402b limits this 
liability to $5,000. 
[1] If the evidence shows that an automobile was being 
driven by an employee of the owner at the time of an acci-
dent, the jury may infer that the employee was operating 
the automobile with the permission of the owner. (Bushnell v. 
Tashiro, 115 Cal. App. 563 [2 P. (2d) 550]; McWhirt.er v. 
Fuller, 35 Cal. App. 288 [170 Pac. 417] ; Pozzobon v. O'Don-
nell, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 151 [36 P. (2d) 236] ; Brown v. Ohev-
rolet. Motor 00.,39 Cal. App. 738 [179 Pac. 697] ; Wagnitz v. 
Scharet.g, 89 Cal. App. 511 [265 Pac. 318]; West.berg v. 
Willde, 14 Cal. (2d) 360 [94 P. (2d) 590]. See cases cited in 
2 Cal. JUl'. 10-Yr. Supp. 508, sec. 326.) Defendant recognizes 
that a jury may draw such an inference but contends that the 
evidence introduced by it in thep:~esent case to show that Coffin 
was driving the car without its permission was so clear, posi-
tive, and uncontradicted that the jury could not reasonably 
conclude that it had given permission, express or implied, for 
such use. Plaintiff concedes t1;1at Coffin was not acting within 
the scope of his employment at the time the accident occurred 
but contends that the evidence is sufficient to justify a finding 
by the jury that at the time of the accident Coffin was oper-
ating the automobile with the implied permission of defendant 
and that the directed verdict was therefore improper. 
An inference is a conclusion as to the existence of a mate-
rial fact that a jury may properly draw from the existence 
of certain primary facts. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. secs. 1958, 
1960, 1832; see cases cited in 10 Cal. Jur. 736-738, sec, 59.) 
[2] It is not always possible for a party to a lawsuit to in-
troduce evidence directly bearing upon the existence of a fact 
that he is attempting to prove. The evidence available to him 
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may serve only to establish the existence of certain primary 
facts 'that are logically connected with' the material fact. If a 
jury can reasonably infer from these primary facts that the 
material fact exists, the party has introduced sufficient evi-
dence to entitle him to have the jury decide the issue. The 
jury is not compelled to draw the inference, however, even in 
the absence- of contrary evidence and may refuse to do so. 
Whether a particular inference can be drawn from certain 
evidence is a question of law, but whether the inference shall 
be drawn, in any given case, is a question of fact for the jury. 
(See cases cited in 10 Cal. Jur. 738-739, sec. 60.) 
[3] Usually, the opposing party introduces evidence as 
to the nonexistence of the fact in issue, and the jury must 
then determine the existence or nonexistence of the fact from 
all the evidence before it. If the evidence contrary to the 
existence of the fact is clear, positive, uncontradicted, and of 
such a nature that it can not rationally be disbelieved, the 
court must instruct the jury that the nonexistence of the fact 
has been established as a matter of law. (Engst.rom v. Auburn 
Aut.o Sales Oorp., 11 Cal. (2d) 64 [77 P. (2d) 1059]; Orouch 
v. Gilmore Oil 00., 5 Cal. (2d) 330 [54 P. (2d) 709] ; Maupin 
4~ v. Solomon, 41 Cal. App. 323 [183 Pac. 198].) [4] The 
jury, however, is the sole judge of. the credibility of the 
witnesses (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1847; see cases cited 
in 27 Cal., Jur. 182" sec. 156) and is free to disbelieve 
them even though they are uncontradicted if there is any 
rational ground for doing so. (Hinkle v. Southern Pacific 00., 
12 Cal. (2d) 691 [87 P. (2d) 349] ; Barsha v. Metro-Goldwyn~ 
Mayer, 32 Cal. App. (2d) 556 [90 P.: (2d) 371]; Burke v. 
Bank of America etc. Assn., 34 Cal. App. (2d) 594 [94 P; 
(2d) 58]; People v. La Fleur, 42 Cal. App, (2d) 50 [108 
P. (2d) 99] . See cases collected in 27 Cal. Jur. 184, sec. 
156; 8 A. L. R. 796.) In most cases" therefore, the jury 
is free to disbelieve the evidence as to the nonexistence of 
the fact and to find that it does exist on the basis of the 
inference. (Bushnell v. Tashirq, supra; Marke~ Street Ry. 00. 
v. George, 116 Cal. App. 572, 576 [3 P. (2d) 41]; Day v. 
General Petroleum Oorp., 32 Cal. App. (2d) 220 [89 P. (2d) 
718].) 
There are many reasons why a jury may refuse to believe a 
witness. Section 1847 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: 
" A witness is presumed to speak the truth. This presumption, 
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462 BLANK 'IJ. COFFIN [20 C~ (2d), 
by the character of his testimony, or by evidence affecting his 
character for truth, honesty, or integrity, or his motives, or 
by contradictory evidence j and the jury are the exclusive 
judges of his credibility." Section 2061 (3) of the Code of 
Civil Procedure provides: "That a witness false in one part of 
his testimony is to be distrusted in others." In passing on the 
credibility of a witness, the jury is entitled to consider his 
interest in the result of the case. (See cases collected in 27 Cal. 
Jur. 180, sec. 154.) 
[5] The. applicatiOD:\of these well settled rules to the facts 
of the present case makes it clear that the trial court erred in 
directing a verdict for the defendant. (See Estate of Flood, 
217 Cal. 763 [21 P. (2d) 579] ; Esta'te of Lances, 216 Cal. 397 
[l{,P. (2d) 768].) The fact that the car was owned by de-
fendant and was being driven by one of its employees was 
sufficient to permit the jury to infer that the car was being , 
driven wi~h defendant's permission. When defendant intro-
duced evidence contrary to such an inference in the testimony 
o:l:Coffin and Stuperich,the issue of permission could be taken 
from the jury and a verdict directed for the defendant only 
if the testimony could not be rationally disbelieved. There 
were several grounds on which the jury could disbelieve the 
testimony. Both Stuperich and Coffin, employees of the de-
fendant, had an interest in the outcome of the case since they 
would naturally wish to remain in the good graces of their 
employer. Coffin's testimony as to how the accident occurred 
directly contradicted the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses, 
and if the jury disbelieved Coffin in this respect, it could dis-
believe him in all respects. The testimony of Coffin and Stu-
perich revealed the following facts that would justify the jury 
in concluding that Coffin was driving the automobile with 
the tacit permission of the defendant: Coffin was given ex-
clusive possession of the automobile; he kept it in his own 
garage without charge to the company; the manual of in-
structions that he received forbade the use of the car on vaca-
tions, but did not forbid its use for personal matters j the 
company could determine that Doffin was habitually using the 
car for his personal business by checking his mileage reports 
against his gasoline reports; Coffin was not discharged after 
discovery of his use of the car on a week-end trip and was 
allowed to resume possession of it after a short lay-off. [6] 
The fact that Coffin was accompanied by a friend in violation 
of the rules of the com:pany' could not establish that he did 
not have permission to drive the car. This fact might be perti-
June 1942] BLANK 'IJ. COFFIN 
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, , 
nent if the passenger were injured and :had knowledge of the 
rule (Albers v. Shell Company, 104 Cal. App. 733 [286 Pac~ 
752] ), but it has no relevancy where a third person is injured. 
(Gibbons v. Naritoka, 102 Cal. App. 669 [283 Pac. 84'5] j Nord 
v. West Michigan Flooring Co., 238 Mich. 669, [214 'N. W, 
236] ; Wright v. Maddox (Tex. Civ. App.) 288 S. W.560.) 
[7] Plaintiff also contends· that the trial court erred in 
refusing to permit her to question Coffin and Stuperich con-
cerning Coffin's personal use of the' car after the accident an(l 
Stuperich's knowledge thereof and failure to protest. Defen7 
dant contends that evidence of circumstances after the acci-
dent cannot be used to estab~ish that Coffin was driving the 
car with the permission of defendant at the time of the acci-
dent, and relies upon cases holding that evidence of precau-
tions taken after an accident are not admissible.to show a 
negligent condition at the time of the accident. (See cases 
cited in 10 Cal. Jur. 829-830, sec. 115.) These cases, however, 
are not analogous to the present one. Evidence of the existence 
of a particular condition, relationship, or status, including 
permission to use an automobile, before' and after an act in 
question is admissible to indicate the e.xisteIuie of the same 
status, condition, or relationship at the time of the act. (Chou-
,~ inard v~ WOOldridge, 102 Conn. 66 [127 Atl. 908] j Walker v~ 
Klopp, .99 Neb. 794 [157 N. W. 962, L. R. A.1916E, 1292] ; 
Leonard v. Kreider, 51 Ohio App. 474 [1 N. E, (2d) 956]; see 
Snowwhite v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co", 344 Mo .. 705 [127 
S. W. (2d) 718] j see cases cited in WigmorejEvidence (3rd 
ed.}secs. 382, 377 j 10 Cal. Jur. 830, note 9, 828-829, sec. 114; 
32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1117 et seq.) In the present case the tes-
timony. of . Coffin and Stuperich revealed facts that would jus. 
tify the jury's concluding that Coffin had permIssion to use 
the car fo'r personal business before the accident, and plain-
tiff should have been permitted to question them concerning 
Coffin's pt)rmission to use the car for his personal business 
after the accident for the purpose of indicating that the same 
relationship existed at the time of the accident. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds,J., concurred. 
CARTER, J., Concurring.-I concur in the conclusion 
reached in the majority opinion but ~annot agree with. the 
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"If the evidence contrary to thc existence of the fact is 
clear, positive, uncontradicted, and of such a nature that it 
can not rationally be disbelieved, the court must instruct the 
jury that the non-existence of the fact has been established 
as a matter of law." That statement is inconsistent with other 
principles enunciated in the opinion. 
It is there said: "If a jury can reasonably infer from these 
primary facts that the material fact exists, the party has in-
troduced sufficient evidence to entitle him to have the jury de-
cide the issue. The jury is not compelled to draw the inf-er-
ence, however, even in the absence of contrary evidence and 
may refuse to do so. -lV:hether a particular inference can be 
drawn from certain evidence is a qltestion of law, bttt whether 
the inference shall be drawn, in any given case, is a question 
of fact for the .fury." (Italics added.) 
Also: "Usually, the opposing party introduces evidence as 
to the non-existence of the fact in issue, and the .fury must 
then determine the existence or non-existence of the fact from 
all the evidence before it." (Italics added.) 
"The .fury, however, is the sole .fudge of the crcd£bility of 
the witnesses ... and is free to dl:sbelieve them even though 
they are uncontradiCted if there is any rational ground for 
doing so." (Italics added.) 
It seems illogical to me to say, that if a jury may reasonably 
infer from the primary facts the existence of the material 
fact, the case may then be decided by the .fury, but that evi-
dence contrary to the inferred fact destroys the inference if 
it is clear, positive, uncontradicted, and cannot be disbelieved. 
The query at once arises, disbelieved by whom? The jury may 
or may not draw that inference as it chooses, but .immediately 
that it is determined as a matter of law that it may be drawn 
by the jury, it is evidence in the case, equal in weight and 
value with any other evidence. Whatever evidence may be in-
troduced by the opponent does nothing more than create a 
conflict in the evidence which must be resolved by the trier of 
fact. That conclusion necessarily stems from the rule stated 
in the majority opinion that the jury is the sole jUdge of the 
credibility of witnesses. What difference can it make On appeal 
where matters of law alone are considered whether the evi-
dence opposing the inference is Clear, positive and uncoutra- • 
dieted ~ It is still within the province of the trier of fact to 
disbelieve such evidence, and if it does, the inference stands 
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of the witnesses, this court cannot say as a matter of law that 
this evidence or that evidence, is clear, positive, uncontra-
dicted and cannot be disbelieved. The very fact that the jury 
finds in favor of the inference and against such evidence con-
clusively shows that it is not clear, or uncontradicted or posi-
tive, or cannot be disbelieved. The jury necessarily must have 
found it unreliable because of one of those factors. 
In my opinion, the true rule with reference to the effect of 
inferences in a case is, that this court's function begins and 
'ends with the determination of the sole question of whether 
a certain inference may be drawn from certain evidence. That 
question is one of law. If the facts do not justify the infer-
ence, it cannot be drawn, and the one relying upon the pur-
ported inference must fail. If, however, it may be said that 
the inference reasonably may be drawn, then it becomes the 
sole function of the jury to decide whether or not it shall 
draw the inference, and whether or not opposing evidence' 
prevails over it. It may, without qualification, weigh that 
inference against any and all evidence opposing it of what-
ever character or nature. Its conclusion on the completion of 
that process is final and conclusive. 
The statement that evidence contrary to the existence of 
the fact established by the inference may overcome the infer-
ence as a matter of law, if clear, positive, uncontradicted and 
of such a nature that it cannot be disbelieved, cannot stand 
in the face of the principles that an inference once permis-
sible, is evidence, and that the jury is the exclusive judge of 
the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence. 
Furthermore, it should be observed that the rule stated in 
effect declares that direct evidence is of greater weight or 
value than indirect or circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial 
evidence is nothing more than one or more inferences drawn 
from a series of proven facts. It is entitled to be given the 
force equal to direct evidence. (10 Cal. JUl'. 1157.) 
The legal test as to the existence of whether an inference 
arises is stated in section 1960 of the Code of Civil Procedure: 
"An inference must be founded: 
"1. On a fact legally proved; and, 
"2. On such a deduction from that fact as is warranted 
by a consideration of the usual propensities or passions of 
men, the particular propensities or passions of the person 
whose act is in question, the course of business, or the course 
of nature." It is for the court to apply that test to determine 
466 BLANK v. COFFIN [20 C. (2d) 
whether an inference may be reasonably drawn from any 
given facts: 
Adherence to the principles above-stated admits of only one 
possible limitation to the rule abovi:l-stated. If the credibility 
of the evidence in opposition to the inference is beyond any 
question when such evidence is subjected to any of the tests 
of credibility, then it might be said to be conclusive on the 
trier of fact. It is at once apparent that that limitation does 
not apply to oral testimony for the reason that one of the 
tests of credibility is the demeanor of the witness and his 
manner of testifying (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1847) ;~the obser-
vation of that factor may be made only by the trier of 
fact. It necessarily cannot 'be determined by an appellate 
court. It is conceivable that under proper- circumstances docu-
mentary evidence might be conclusive, but the instances would 
be rare. It is doubtful if the physical circumstances would 
,ever be conclusive inasmuch as their effectiveness is practi-
cally invariably dependent upon inferences that may arise 
therefrom, and as we have seen, the trier of fact mayor may 
not draw those inferences. The statutes indicate the rarity of 
conclusive evidence. They provide: 
"Conclusive or unanswerable evidence is that which the 
law does not permit to be contradicted. For example, the 
reCOrd of a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be con-
tradicted by the parties to it." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1837.) 
"No evidence is by law made conclusive or unanswerable, 
unless so declared by this code." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1978.) 
The cases, Engstrom v.Auburn Auto Sales Corp., 11 Cal. 
(2d) 64 [77 P. (2d) 1059J ; Crouch v. Gilmore Oil Co., 5 Cal. 
(2d) 330 [54 P. (2d) 709J; and Maupin v. Solomon, 41 Cal. 
App. 323 [183 Pac. 198J, have added only confusion to an 
otherwise clear and concise rule. They should not be fol-
lowed, much less extended. They fail to give to an inference 
its proper place in the law, and entirely overlook the prin-
ciple that the trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the weight 
of the evidence and credibility of witnesses. 
In my opinion the evidence in the case at bar is sufficient 
to justify the inference that defendant Coffin was driving 
the automobile involved in the accident with, the permission 
of defendant Mercantile Acceptance Corporation, and this 
issue should have been submitted to the jury. The judgment 
entered on the order granting a directed verdict as to the last 
named defendant should therefore be reversed. 
Shenk, J., concurred. 
.,' 
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THE STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF THE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA et aI., Petitioners, v. THE 
SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 
Respondent. 
[1] Certiorari-Jurisdiction-Supreme Court.-The Supreme 
Court has jurisdiction over a certiorari proceeding to annul a 
contempt order, instituted within 30 days after the denial by 
a District Court of Appeal of a writ of prohibition to restrain 
entertainment of the contempt proceeding. 
[2] Prohibition-Determination-Res Judicata.-It cannot be said 
that the action of the District Court of Appeal in denying 
without opinion a writ of prohibition to restrain a contempt 
proceeding is res judicata on the issues in a certiorari proceed-
ing 'to annul the contempt order made therein, since the writ 
may have been denied for reasons other than that the claini 
was without merit. The rule that the ex parte denial without 
wI'itten opinion of an application for such writ is. a final ad-
judication of the facts in the petition, is inapplicable in the 
circumstances. 
[8] Certiorari-Jurisdiction-Supreme Court.-The Supreme Court 
has jurisdiction over a certiorari proceeding· instituted within 
30 days following the voluntary withdrawal, prior to judg-
ment, of a similar proceeding in a District Court of Appeal. 
In such case, Const., art. VI, sec. 4c, relating to the time when 
decisions of the District Courts of Appeal become final, is inap-
plicable. 
[4] Id.-Hearing~Moot Questions.-A certiorari proceeding to re-
view an order adjudging guilt of contempt for disobedience of 
a writ of mandate directing reinstatement of civil service em~ 
ployees and payment of salaries is rio,t rendered moot by the 
adoption by one respondent of a resolutidn of intention to com-
ply with the writ, where the contempt order affects as well 
other parties one of whom is directly affected by the main 
issue, the payment of salaries. 
McK.Dig, References: [1, 3] Certiorari, § 50; [2] Prohibitiob.,' 
§ 59(1); [4] Certiorari, § 83; [5] Civil Service, § 14; [6] Manda-
mus, §106; Civil Service, §14; [7,8] Contempt, §81; [9] Con-
tempt, § 78. 
